Section 7.1 can become a significant source of delay in a DGCA Type Certification submission. It requires a verifiable chain across firmware, hardware, and ground-control software, including integrity verification, POST, secure updates, and compliance-critical parameter controls supported by objective evidence. We implement and validate that chain on supported ArduPilot or PX4 platforms—without requiring a hardware replacement or creating unnecessary fork lock-in.
It connects hardware, firmware, and ground-control software into one verifiable chain—not a single checkbox. Each control requires an appropriate firmware-side implementation and, where applicable, a matching ground-control interface. If either side is incomplete, the overall evidence chain remains incomplete.
Each control is implemented in the relevant firmware and ground-control components, mapped to the applicable requirement, and demonstrated through testing rather than assertion alone. The final two are additional security controls beyond the items mapped to Section 7.1.
Signature verification runs in the bootloader, before any flight code executes. An unsigned image or one altered by a single byte fails the check and the boot halts. The aircraft will not arm when firmware authenticity and integrity cannot be verified.
Checksumming code and data independently means a tampered data partition cannot hide behind a valid code checksum or the other way around. Each segment is verified against its own registered SHA-256 reference.
The reference values the aircraft checks against are themselves protected. They cannot be edited in the field or swapped by an operator; a new set is written only when a manufacturer-signed firmware release is installed.
Validated on every power cycle, not once at the factory. A checksum mismatch prevents arming, and each result is written to an evidence log that can support the Type Certification submission.
Unauthorized modification is blocked by design and backed by a test record: tampered images, unsigned images, and images signed with the wrong key are each shown to be rejected. The resulting test record can be included in the objective-evidence package for assessment.
Every update is verified before it is applied—never afterward and never merely as a dismissible warning. Unsigned, tampered, wrong-key, and unauthorized rollback attempts are rejected and logged. After an authorized upgrade, the registered reference hashes are rewritten securely.
Parameters that define the certified compliance boundaries are controlled by the signed release. Normal mission variables may remain adjustable within those approved boundaries, while changes to the boundaries require an authorized release and the applicable certification-change process.
Every security-relevant event is written to a cryptographically signed, tamper-evident log. The log can be verified offline without relying solely on the aircraft that generated it, providing an independently checkable record of security-relevant events.
The command link uses per-aircraft MAVLink signing to authenticate messages from the configured ground station. Commands that fail authentication or originate from an unpaired station are rejected according to the configured acceptance policy.
We review your hardware, firmware baseline, and current Type Certification stage to define the applicable Section 7.1 scope.
A defined scope and timeline against the full Section 7.1 control set. No indefinite engagement.
We implement the controls mapped to Section 7.1, together with the selected additional security controls, across the relevant firmware and ground-control components.
We validate POST behaviour, prepare evidence logs, and support the relevant documentation during your Type Certification submission.
We provide Section 7.1 implementation support for two widely used open-source autopilot platforms. Choose your stack—the implementation, validation, and evidence discipline remain consistent in either case.
Tell us about your flight controller and current Type Certification stage. We will respond with a defined scope—not a sales pitch.